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Two New Case Developments in 
Landlord-Tenant Law 
Myron Moskovitz 
Introduction 
My good friend Roger Bernhardt asked me to write a 
piece on some recent landlord-tenant cases. In a past life, 
I was somewhat of a maven in this area. Now I’ve moved 
on, having just formed a new appellate law firm with 
some retired appellate justices and law clerks—and, of 
course, Roger, the state’s leading expert in real property 
litigation. See MoskovitzAppellateTeam.com. 
So, here’s my contribution to this august journal. 
Anti-SLAPP Motions: Olive Props., LP v 
Coolwaters Enters., Inc. 
An “anti-SLAPP” motion to strike a complaint (see 
CCP §425.16) is a powerful tool in the hands of a clever 
defense counsel. As soon as it’s filed, everything stops—
except the motion. Trial is stayed. Even discovery is 
stayed. If the motion is denied, the defendant can 
immediately appeal—and everything stays stayed. 
In an unlawful detainer case, of course, the landlord 
wants nothing stayed. He wants to get to trial, judgment, 
and eviction ASAP. 
So, the tenant’s lawyer should look for every 
opportunity to use the anti-SLAPP motion, right? Not so 
fast.... 
In Olive Props., LP v Coolwaters Enters., Inc. (2015) 
241 CA4th 1169 (reported at p 20), a shopping center 
owner filed an unlawful detainer complaint based on 
nonpayment of rent and common area maintenance 
charges. The tenant filed an anti-SLAPP motion, claiming 
the action was filed to punish the tenant for filing an 
earlier action against the owner for breach of the covenant 
of quiet enjoyment (by renting another space to a pizza 
restaurant whose customers allegedly took up all of the 
available parking spaces). The trial court denied the 
tenant’s motion, finding the tenant had failed to satisfy the 
“first prong” of the anti-SLAPP procedure (i.e., a prima 
facie case that the present suit was brought to punish 
activity protected by the First Amendment) because the 
tenant had failed to supply evidence that the landlord 
brought his unlawful detainer action because the tenant 
had sued the landlord. 
The court of appeal affirmed, noting that “merely 
because Tenant’s lawsuit for breach of the covenant of 
quiet enjoyment and negligent interference with 
prospective economic relations preceded Landlord’s 
unlawful detainer action does not mean that the unlawful 
detainer action arose from Tenant’s protected activity in 
bringing the prior lawsuit.” 241 CA4th at 1176 (emphasis 
in original). The court noted the danger the tenant’s claim 
posed: “[A] nonpaying tenant should not be able to 
frustrate or stall an anticipated eviction by filing a 
preemptive complaint against the landlord, followed by a 
special motion to strike the landlord’s unlawful detainer 
complaint on the ground it arose out of the tenant’s 
protected petitioning activity in filing the first lawsuit.” 
241 CA4th at 1176. 
The court might have also noted that when the 
unlawful detainer suit is based on nonpayment of rent, it 
would seldom make sense to find that it was brought for 
some reason other than a desire to get rid of a nonpaying 
tenant. Isn’t getting the rent the whole point of renting out 
property? Unless the landlord had a history of putting up 
with late payment or nonpayment, his motive would seem 
to be to collect rent, not to punish the tenant. 
The court also affirmed the trial court’s award of 
attorney fees against the tenant for bringing a frivolous 
anti-SLAPP motion, noting that the tenant had “succeeded 
in stalling the unlawful detainer action for a protracted 
period of time by bringing a meritless special motion to 
strike.” 241 CA4th at 1172. The amount awarded ($3392) 
wasn’t much because not much litigation happened up to 
the ruling on the anti-SLAPP motion. But I’ve seen 
heavier anti-SLAPP battles that could have resulted in 
much higher awards. 
The bottom line: It’s OK to use it, but don’t abuse it. 
There are other more effective and time-tested pretrial 
motions and defenses that a tenant can successfully 
launch in defending an unlawful detainer action. See, e.g., 
California Landlord-Tenant Practice, chap 10 (2d ed Cal 
CEB). For discussion of anti-SLAPP motions in landlord-
tenant actions generally, see Landlord-Tenant §§5.18A–
5.18B, 7.78B. 
Materiality of Breach of Lease: Boston, 
LLC v Juarez 
Here’s a curious appellate department opinion that 
won’t be followed, in my humble opinion. In Boston, LLC 
v Juarez (2015) 240 CA4th Supp 28 (reported at 38 CEB 
RPLR 158 (Nov. 2015)), the rental agreement provided 
that “any failure” to comply with the terms of the 
agreement would allow the landlord to terminate the 
tenant’s right to possession. The court held that because 
of this provision, the tenant’s failure to obtain renter’s 
insurance (required under the rental agreement) allowed 
the landlord to evict, whether or not the breach was 
material. 
This is a very questionable decision. It allows 
landlords—simply by inserting into the agreement a 
boilerplate provision that prospective tenants may not 
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even notice—to evade the well-established materiality 
requirement, which is designed to protect tenants from 
losing their homes and businesses for trivial breaches. In 
rent control jurisdictions, the decision might provide a 
convenient means to evict tenants paying below-market 
rent, in order to raise rents to market levels—thereby 
undermining the ordinance’s requirement that landlords 
have just cause to evict. See, e.g., Landlord-Tenant, chap 
7. 
There are many other California court of appeal 
decisions not allowing an eviction for a trivial breach of 
the lease. See, e.g., Landlord-Tenant §§8.58–8.60, 7.57. 
Our Supreme Court Tackles 
Greenhouse Gas Analysis in EIRs 
Alan Ramo 
Introduction 
The California Supreme Court probably surprised a 
few observers when it rejected the California Department 
of Fish and Wildlife’s greenhouse gas analysis of the 
Newhall Ranch development in its recent decision in 
Center for Biological Diversity v Department of Fish & 
Wildlife (2015) 62 C4th 204 (reported at p 13). State 
appellate courts have been rather deferential to challenges 
to the implementation of California’s Global Warming 
Solutions Act (known as AB 32). See Our Children’s 
Earth Found. v California Air Resources Bd. (2015) 234 
CA4th 870; Association of Irritated Residents v Air 
Resources Bd. (2012) 206 CA4th 1487, reported at 35 
CEB RPLR 135 (Sept. 2012). Courts hesitate to wade into 
technical expert analyses such as greenhouse gas 
emissions analysis. 
Nevertheless, the supreme court’s large majority (5–2) 
did not hesitate to dive into the CEQA “significance” 
analysis contained in the project’s environmental impact 
report (EIR) and find a fundamental flaw in the project’s 
attempt to use as guidance the state Air Resources 
Board’s (ARB) approach to greenhouse gas regulation. 
Perhaps even more alarming to proponents of greenhouse 
gas-emitting projects, the court, while accepting ARB’s 
AB 32 emission reduction goal as a CEQA “threshold” 
for significance, at the same time questioned the 
threshold’s continued utility after 2020, when more 
dramatic reductions will be required under state climate 
change laws. Lurking in the court’s willingness to 
question the project-level compliance with the AB 32 
significance threshold calculation is the court’s skepticism 
toward game-playing with such baselines. For an 
analogous situation, though not cited by the court, see 
Neighbors for Smart Rail v Exposition Metro Line Constr. 
Auth. (2013) 57 C4th 439, discussed by Golden Gate 
University Professor Paul S. Kibel in Sea Level Rise, 
Saltwater Intrusion and Endangered Fisheries—Shifting 
Baselines for the Bay Delta Conservation Plan, 38 
Environs: Envt’l L & Pol’y J 259, 260 (Spring 2015). See 
also Ramo, The California Offset Game: Who Wins and 
Who Loses?, 20 Hastings W-NW J Envt’l L & Pol’y 109 
(2014). 
Analysis 
Because this case was brought under CEQA, the 
court’s analysis is through a CEQA lens rather than 
simply a policy analysis. The legal issue before the court 
was whether the EIR properly analyzed whether the 
greenhouse gases from the proposed development 
(anticipated to house more than 50,000 people) are 
significant and thus require mitigation. Alternatively, if 
there are unavoidable impacts after deploying all feasible 
and reasonable mitigations, a statement of overriding 
considerations would be required if the project’s benefits 
are deemed to outweigh its impacts. 
The court first analyzed what kind of a cumulative 
impact problem is presented by greenhouse gas emissions 
in California. It recognized that California emissions have 
global impact and that any individual project’s impacts 
are uncertain. However, the question was whether this 
project, together with present and future projects, is 
cumulatively considerable. The court then determined that 
it was appropriate to reference state policies that are 
attempting to address California’s reasonable contribution 
to a solution to climate change, which led it to accept 
ARB’s plan to achieve AB 32’s goal of a reduction to 
1990 emission levels as a suitable significance threshold. 
That plan requires a 29 percent reduction of emissions 
from what the level of emissions would have been in 
2020—the so-called “business as usual” scenario. In 
developing its analysis, the court cited extensively to an 
article authored by Sandy Crockett, the Bay Area Air 
Quality Management District’s counsel, published by the 
GGU Environmental Law Journal—an article every 
practitioner representing a project proponent or opponent 
should review. See Crockett, Addressing the Significance 
of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under CEQA: California’s 
Search for Regulatory Certainty in an Uncertain World, 4 
Golden Gate U Envt’l LJ 203 (July 2011). 
The court found that while the project would add 
greenhouse gases to the environment, the issue was 
whether the added emissions were less than what would 
happen without the project. After all, the population that 
would live in the city would live somewhere else; 
somewhere else may lead to even more emissions. 
Further, the project should be designed to contribute its 
appropriate share of reductions consistent with ARB’s AB 
32 plan. 
